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Abstract
All else equal, higher wages translate into higher inﬂation. More rigid wages imply a weaker
response of inﬂation to shocks. This view of the wage channel is deeply entrenched in central
banks’ views and models of their economies. In this paper, we present a model with equilibrium
unemployment which has three distinctive properties. First, using a search and matching model
with right-to-manage wage bargaining, a proper wage channel obtains. Second, accounting for
ﬁxed costs associated with maintaining an existing job greatly magniﬁes proﬁt ﬂuctuations for
any given degree of wage ﬂuctuations, which allows the model to reproduce the ﬂuctuations of
unemployment over the business cycle. And third, the model implies a reasonable elasticity of
steady state unemployment with respect to changes in beneﬁts. The calibration of the model
implies low proﬁts, but does not require a small gap between the value of working and the value
of unemployment for the worker.
JEL Classiﬁcation System: E31,E32,E24,J64
Keywords: Bargaining, Unemployment, Business Cycle, Real Rigidities.5
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Non-technical summary
In the recent past the inﬂuence of the labor market on price and output dynamics has attracted
considerable attention. The channel from wages to inﬂation plays a key role in explaining
aggregate price dynamics. All else equal, increased wages are associated with higher rates of
inﬂation, and a slow adjustment of wages to shocks translates into inﬂation inertia. This view
appears to be shared by central banks around the globe and it is a central feature of their policy
models.1
At the same time ﬂows in and out of employment take center stage in policy discussions. This
in mind, it is surprising that to date there appears to be no model which accounts at the same
time for the ﬂuctuations in main labor market variables and for a wage channel to inﬂation.
This paper is meant to ﬁll the gap.
The introduction of the Mortensen Pissarides search and matching labor market model (MP
model) into a DSGE model has gained a lot of attention recently. The MP model explains
movements on the labor market by the ratio of posted vacancies to unemployed workers. Search
is a costly and time consuming activity implying that existing labor relations oﬀer an intrinsic
value to the match of workers and ﬁrm. The joint surplus of the employment relation is shared
between ﬁrms and workers by settling on the wage rate and the number of hours worked through
bargaining.
From a quantitative point of view, the bargaining approach that is most commonly used has
two important drawbacks. First, there is no proper wage channel. That is, an increase in wages
(all else equal) would not translate into an increase in inﬂation. Second, the ﬂuctuations in the
labor market produced by the model fall short of the ﬂuctuations observed in the data.
To obtain a wage channel we use an alternative bargaining variant. In the standard approach,
eﬃcient bargaining (EB), wages and hours are set optimally. In the variant employed, right-to-
manage (RTM), workers and ﬁrms bargain about the wage rate while ﬁrms choose hours worked
given that wage rate. In contrast to the standard case of EB, RTM has the advantage that the
wage rate enters directly into the marginal cost term and aﬀects inﬂation directly.
The mechanism which we introduce into the model to mimic employment ﬂuctuation relates
to the deﬁnition of ﬁrm proﬁts. Firms post vacancies until the expected proﬁt from a further
1 A non-exhaustive list of central bank models which feature a wage channel is given by the Federal Reserve
Board’s FRB/US and SIGMA models, the Bank of England Quarterly Model and the European Central Bank’s
old and New Area Wide Model.6
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vacancy equals the cost of the vacancy. High proﬁt ﬂuctuations therefore imply high ﬂuctuations
in labor market ﬂows. The standard model abstracts from costs associated with maintaining an
existing job which are independent from the hours worked per worker. Contributions to health
insurance cost but also non-productive or administrative workers are examples for these costs.
Introducing these costs into our model drives a wedge between ﬁrms’ revenues and ﬁrms’ proﬁts,
increase the ﬂuctuations of proﬁts and thus the ﬂuctuations of employment.
The combination of right-to-manage bargaining and ﬁxed costs thus brings back to life the wage
channel in a model with a realistic degree of unemployment ﬂuctuations as our calibration to
US data illustrates.7
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1 Introduction
The channel from wages to inﬂation plays a key role in explaining aggregate price dynamics. All
else equal, increased wages are associated with higher rates of inﬂation, and a slow adjustment
of wages to shocks translates into inﬂation inertia.2 This view appears to be shared by central
banks around the globe and it is a central feature of their policy models.3
At the same time ﬂows in and out of employment take center stage in policy discussions. This
in mind, it is surprising that to date there appears to be no model which accounts both for the
ﬂuctuations in main labor market variables and for a wage channel to inﬂation. This paper is
meant to ﬁll the gap.
In this paper, we develop a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions in the labor
market, which has three characteristic features: it incorporates a wage channel to inﬂation, it
replicates the ﬂuctuations of unemployment over the business cycle and it implies a reasonable
response of unemployment rates to changes in the level of unemployment beneﬁts.
Building on Trigari’s (2006) right-to-manage wage bargaining framework (RTM, henceforth),
we account for ﬁxed costs associated with maintaining an existing job.4 These reduce average
job-related proﬁts and amplify ﬂuctuations of proﬁts in percentage terms. Since proﬁts are
the driving force behind hiring activity, the model can be calibrated to match the cyclical
ﬂuctuations of US labor market variables witnessed in the data. At the same time, the model
preserves a channel from wages to inﬂation. We furthermore show that the model replicates
second moments of the labor market data without having to rely on an implausibly high elasticity
of unemployment with respect to beneﬁts or a high degree of stickiness in wages of new hires.5
2 Here “all else equal” subsumes both the case in which wages increase due to a genuine “wage shock”, keeping
other shocks constant, and the case in which a change in calibration makes wages more responsive to shocks
in general, keeping constant those features of the calibration which are not linked to wage responsiveness.
3 A non-exhaustive list of central bank models which feature a wage channel is given by the Federal Reserve
Board’s FRB/US and SIGMA models, the Bank of England Quarterly Model and the European Central Bank’s
old and New Area Wide Model.
4 Cost items associated with a job which are independent of the actual hours worked include the cost of health
insurance provided by the employer, costs associated with part of the supply of work-infrastructure (such as
IT services and the rental of oﬃce space) as well as with the provision of overhead administrative services, or
costs related to labor turnover. A few authors have pointed out in eﬃcient bargaining frameworks that the
presence of ﬁxed costs or turnover costs makes a ﬁrm’s net payoﬀ (after paying the ﬁxed costs) more responsive
to productivity variation, see the references in Mortensen and Nagypal (2007).
5 The recent literature on labor market matching has identiﬁed these two properties as potential shortcomings
of models relying on eﬃcient (wage) bargaining, which is the bargaining assumption most frequently used.
Compare Costain and Reiter (2008) and Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) for a discussion of the elasticity of
unemployment with respect to beneﬁts as well as Pissarides (2007) and Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2007)
for evidence on wages of new hires.8
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A wage channel, in our understanding, is present whenever wages have a direct inﬂuence on
inﬂationary developments. As Trigari (2006) and Christoﬀel and Linzert (2005) have shown,
this is the case under RTM.6 Direct means that wages do not need to work through employment
ﬁrst to cause a reaction of inﬂation. In particular, in the search and matching setup which we
use this means that also wages of existing matches have an impact on inﬂation. The argument
is as follows: a job produces a labor good according to production function yL
t = hα
t ,α∈ (0,1),
where ht are hours per worker. Given a bargained wage rate, wt, and facing a real product
price, xL
t , labor ﬁrms set hours along their labor demand curves, so xL
t αhα−1
t = wt. Price-setting
ﬁrms acquire the labor good under perfect competition at price xL
t and produce diﬀerentiated







of wages thus translates into marginal costs and therefore into the behavior of inﬂation.7
In models of search and matching, unemployment ﬂuctuations are closely linked to labor ﬁrms’
proﬁts. In our model, these unemployment ﬂuctuations are ampliﬁed as follows. Let Φ ≥ 0b e




t −wtht−Φ, can in equilibrium be expressed as ΨL
t = 1−α
α wtht−Φ. In the absence
of ﬁxed costs therefore, in equilibrium any 1% increase in proﬁts also means a 1% increase in
wages per employee. Since wages per employee do not ﬂuctuate much over the business cycle,
labor proﬁts do not ﬂuctuate enough to induce signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations in hiring activity. We
show that, as a result, unemployment does not ﬂuctuate enough. If ﬁxed costs of maintaining a
job exist, however, the ratio of wages to proﬁts is no longer constant over the business cycle. As
we show algebraically in the paper, the larger the ﬁxed cost the more do labor proﬁts ﬂuctuate
in percentage terms for any given ﬂuctuation in wages. Therefore even if wages per employee
are relatively smooth, percentage job-related proﬁts can ﬂuctuate signiﬁcantly. This reconciles
the wage channel with labor market ﬂuctuations.
It appears necessary to relate these results to the majority of literature which uses eﬃcient
(wage) bargaining (EB, henceforth) instead. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007) clarify that under
EB two properties must be met to replicate unemployment ﬂuctuations. First, wages must
6 Right-to-manage here is taken to mean that ﬁrms and workers bargain about the hourly wage rate only. At
this wage rate, the ﬁrm is free to choose employment along the intensive (hours worked) margin. Through
this the marginal wage rate and the average wage rate coincide. The work-horse of the literature in contrast
is eﬃcient bargaining. There, ﬁrms and workers bargain simultaneously about both hours worked and wages.
7 In an eﬃcient bargaining setup in contrast, the marginal costs are determined by the marginal rate of substi-
tution and the marginal product of labor. Krause and Lubik (2007) show that under this setup wages do not
have a direct impact on marginal costs.9
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not move one-to-one with labor revenue over the cycle. This provided, increases in revenue
translate into more than proportional increases in proﬁts. Second, labor proﬁts in steady state
must be small so as to induce sizeable cyclical ﬂuctuations of proﬁts in percentage terms. The
proportionality of wages and revenue cannot be circumvented in our setup, while the condition
that steady state proﬁts need to be small carries over to our model with RTM. The per-period
ﬁxed cost, Φ > 0, ensures both that steady state proﬁts are small and that the tight link
between wages and revenue does not extend to proﬁts. In inﬂuential papers, Hall (2005) and
Shimer (2004) argue that if Nash-bargaining is eﬃcient, smoother wages expose a ﬁrm’s proﬁts
more to cyclical ﬂuctuations in revenue. This helps to amplify unemployment ﬂuctuations. With
RTM instead the share of wages in revenue is constant over the business cycle. A smoother wage
then would mean that revenues and proﬁts would ﬂuctuate by less. Indeed, absent the ﬁxed
costs, in order to achieve vacancy and unemployment ﬂuctuations of a realistic size, wages under
RTM would need to be far more volatile than they are in the data. Furthermore the argument
that sticky wages increase unemployment ﬂuctuations requires in particular that the wages of
new hires must be sticky, for which there is only scant empirical support, cp. Pissarides (2007)
and Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2007).
On a ﬁnal note, calibrations of matching models under EB similar to the one used in this paper
tend to imply a large drop of the unemployment rate when beneﬁts are reduced, see Costain
and Reiter (2008) and Mortensen and Nagypal (2007). Instead when we calibrate the RTM
model with ﬁxed costs to US data, we obtain an elasticity of the unemployment rate to changes
in beneﬁts which is in line with empirical estimates, e.g. the estimates by Nickell and Layard
(1999). The reason is that under RTM job-related proﬁts can be small in steady state while the
surplus of workers need not be negligible at the same time. This means that changes in beneﬁts
do not dramatically change the incentives to supply labor.
Apart from the hiring activity, the model adheres to the structure commonly employed in central
bank models which follow the New Keynesian approach as in Smets and Wouters (2007). In
particular, we show that RTM bargaining lends itself to staggered Calvo type wage-setting which
induces real rigidities in the sense of Ball and Romer (1990). We view this structural similarity
with the current vintage of policy models, the retention of a channel from wages to inﬂation and
a reasonable empirical success of the model as key requirements to bring models with equilibrium
unemployment closer to policy applications at central banks.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We present a New Keynesian model with10
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search and matching frictions in the labor market and staggered right-to-manage bargaining
in Section 2. Thereafter, in Section 3, we calibrate the model to US data. Section 4 makes
the three points of this paper: First, it shows the existence of the wage channel algebraically
and then by means of impulse responses. Second, it highlights the importance of ﬁxed costs
for unemployment ﬂuctuations in the model in general and in the calibrated model economy in
particular. Third, it illustrates that the model implies a reasonable reaction of the economy’s
steady state unemployment rate in response to changes in the level of beneﬁts. A ﬁnal Section
concludes. The Appendix collects the linearized model economy and the steady state.
2 The New Keynesian Model Economy
We incorporate search and matching frictions ` a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) into an
otherwise plain New Keynesian business cycle model. In order to make our point most clearly,
we abstract from many of the frictions and features typically entertained in the recent empirical
New Keynesian literature. In particular, we abstract from capital formation and the various
frictions involved. We further abstract from ﬁrm-speciﬁc production factors and price and wage
indexation. The model’s production side features competitive factor markets in the only price-
setting sector. Wages at the individual labor good ﬁrm are set in a Calvo-staggered manner.
One time period in the model refers to a calendar time of one month.
2.1 Preferences and Consumers’ Constraints









where E0 marks expectations conditional on period 0 information and β ∈ (0,1) is the time-
discount factor. u(ci,t,c t−1,h i,t) is a standard period utility function of the form
u(ci,t,c t−1,h i,t)=






Here, ci,t denotes consumption of member i, ct−1 denotes aggregate consumption last period
and hi,t are hours worked by member i. κL is a positive scaling parameter of disutility of work,
  ∈ [0,1) indicates an external habit motive.11
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Family Welfare and Budget Constraint
There is a large number of identical families in the economy with unit measure. Each family
consists of a measure of 1−ut employed members and ut unemployed members both with above











Let U(ct,c t−1,u t,{hi,t}) denote the aggregate per-period utility function of the family:
U(ct,c t−1,u t,{hi,t}): =
 1
0
u(ci,t,c t−1,h i,t)di, (4)
where consumption ct is the average consumption level of family members and {hi,t} is shorthand
for the distribution of hours worked. Given its arguments, the utility function U(·,·,·,·)g i v e s
the value of period family-utility when consumption spending ct is optimally distributed among
family members. The representative family pools the labor income of its working members,
unemployment beneﬁts of the unemployed members and ﬁnancial income. Its budget constraint
is given by
ct + tt =
 1−ut
0








where consumption per capita, ct, is a choice variable of the family. tt are lump-sum taxes per
capita payable by the family. wi,thi,t is the real wage per hour times hours worked by individual
family member i. b are real unemployment beneﬁts paid to unemployed family members. The
family holds Dt units of a risk-free one-period nominal bond (government debt) which pays a
gross nominal return Rt b
t in period t +1 . Pt is the aggregate price-level.  b
t denotes a serially
correlated shock to the risk premium, with log( b
t)=ρb log( b
t−1)+ζb




b). It drives a wedge between the return on bonds held by the families and the
interest rate controlled by the central bank, see Smets and Wouters (2007). The family owns
representative shares of all ﬁrms in the economy. Ψt denotes real dividend income per member











i,tdi are the proﬁts arising in the diﬀerentiating industry and in the labor
good industry, respectively; see Section 2.2.12
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The Family’s First-order Conditions
The family maximizes welfare function (3) by choosing consumption, ct, and bond-holdings, Dt,











where marginal utility of consumption is λt =( ct −  ct−1)
−σ. The optimal consumption plan










=0 , ∀t. (8)
2.2 Three Sectors of Production: Firms
There are three sectors of production. Firms in the ﬁrst sector produce a homogenous interme-
diate good, which we shall call the “labor good”. These ﬁrms need to ﬁnd exactly one worker
in order to produce. They take hours worked as their sole input into production. In the model,
searching for a worker is a costly and time-consuming process due to matching frictions. Once a
ﬁrm and a worker have met, they infrequently Nash-bargain over the hourly wage rate. We en-
tertain the right-to-manage framework of Trigari (2006). Given this wage rate, the ﬁrm decides
in each period how many hours of work it wants to hire. Nominal wages in the labor sector are
sticky ` a la Calvo (1983). Firms and workers cannot rebargain their nominal hourly wage rate
in every period. This feature is deeply entrenched in New Keynesian macro-economic models in
use at central banks, see for example Smets and Wouters (2005) and Edge, Kiley, and Laforte
(2007).9 Labor goods are sold to a wholesale sector in a perfectly competitive market. Firms in
the wholesale sector take the intermediate labor good as their sole input and produce diﬀeren-
tiated goods using a constant-returns-to-scale production technology. Subject to price-setting
impediments ` a la Calvo, they sell under monopolistic competition to a ﬁnal retail sector.10 Re-
tailers bundle diﬀerentiated goods into a homogenous consumption/investment basket, yt. They
8 In fact, the family chooses {ci,t} and Dt. Since utility of family members is additively separable in consumption
and leisure, cf. (2), the optimal choice of the family involves full consumption insurance, ci,t = ct, for all family
members.
9 As argued in the introduction, in our model environment sticky or unresponsive wages are not instrumental
in generating labor market ﬂuctuations. This contrasts the RTM setup with the case of eﬃcient bargaining.
10 Following most of the literature we part the markup pricing decision from the labor demand decision. Kuester
(2007) highlights that search and matching frictions in principle make labor a temporarily ﬁrm-speciﬁc factor
of production. When price-setting and labor market activity are conducted in the same sector, real rigidities
arise even under eﬃcient bargaining.13
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sell this ﬁnal good to consumers and to the government at price Pt. We next turn to a detailed
description of the respective sectors. In the following, subscript index j will refer to wholesale
good ﬁrm/product j. Subscript i will refer to labor good ﬁrm/ﬁrm-worker match i.
Retail Firms
The retail sector operates in perfectly competitive factor markets. It takes wholesale goods of























where Pj,t marks the price of good yj,t. Pt coincides with the consumer/GDP price index. The








 >1 is thus the own-price elasticity of demand for diﬀerentiated goods.
Wholesale Firms
Firms in the wholesale sector have unit mass and are indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. Firm j produces






j,t denotes ﬁrm j’s demand for the intermediate labor good which it can acquire in a
perfectly competitive market at real price xL
t . Real period proﬁts of ﬁrm j,Ψ C









The ﬁrst term gives wholesale ﬁrm revenues, the second term marks real payments for the labor
good. The real price for one unit of the labor good is xL
t .
We follow Calvo (1983), Yun (1996) in assuming that in each period a random fraction ω ∈ [0,1)
of ﬁrms cannot reoptimize their price. Those ﬁrms which reoptimize their price in period t face14
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the problem of maximizing the value of their enterprise by choosing their sales price, Pj,t, taking
into account the pricing frictions, demand function (11) and production function (12). Assuming
that ﬁrms at least break even ex ante and realizing that for any given demand the optimal factor
input choice leads to marginal costs which are independent of the production level, the price-
















Here mct are real marginal costs, which are given by
mct = xL
t . (14)
βt,t+s := βs λt+s
λt is the equilibrium stochastic discount factor. The typical reoptimizing wholesale
































denotes the period proﬁts of ﬁrm j. These proﬁts accrue to the representative family, cp.
equations (5) and (6).
Labor Good Firms
The labor good is homogenous. Each ﬁrm in this sector consists of one and only one worker
matched with an entrepreneur. In period t there is thus a mass (1−ut) of operative labor ﬁrms.
Match i can produce amount yL




zt is a labor sector-wide technology shock, which follows an AR(1) process:
log(zt) − log(z)=ρz(log(zt−1) − log(z)) + ζz
t ,
where ρz ∈ [0,1) and ζz
t
iid ∼ N(0,σ2
z). Here, as in the following, a reference to a variable, e.g. zt,
without time subscript, e.g. z, refers to that variable’s steady state value. The technology shock
is identical over the diﬀerent matches.15
ECB
Working Paper Series No 923
August 2008
2.3 Labor Market – Matching, Bargaining and Vacancy Posting
We now turn to the speciﬁcation of the labor market in our model. We ﬁrst describe the
matching technology and then focus on the bargaining and vacancy posting decisions.
Matching the Firms and Workers
The matching process is governed by a Cobb-Douglas matching technology
mt = σm(ut)ξ(vt)1−ξ,σ m > 0,ξ∈ (0,1). (18)
Here mt is the number of new matches of workers with ﬁrms, vt is the number of job vacancies.
A searching ﬁrm ﬁnds a worker in period t with probability qt = mt
vt . An unemployed worker
will ﬁnd a job with probability st = mt
ut .
In the U.S., according to Hall (2005), most of the variation of employment over the business
cycle is explained by variations in vacancy posting while the separation rate appears to be rather
stable. We therefore assume that separations occur with a constant, exogenous probability
ϑ ∈ (0,1) in each period.11 New matches in t, mt, become productive for the ﬁrst time in t+1.
As a consequence of these assumptions, the employment rate nt := 1 − ut evolves according to
nt =( 1− ϑ)nt−1 + mt−1. (19)
Wage Bargaining
Due to a ﬁxed cost of posting a vacancy, κ, and decreasing returns-to-scale at the individual
labor ﬁrm level, formed matches entail economic rents. Firms and workers bargain about their
share of the overall match surplus. The paper follows den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) in
assuming that the family takes the labor supply decision for its workers. We start by describing
the gain of a representative family from having an additional member i in employment.




















11 This view is not uncontended in the literature. For example, Fujita and Ramey (2007) reject the view that
variations in the separation rate are negligible for explaining variations in unemployment relative to variations
in hiring activity. A similar point is made by Pissarides (2007) and Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2007). In the
current paper we follow most of the literature, not least for the sake of clarity of exposition, and abstract from
endogenous separation decisions.16
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The value of a worker in employment depends on his wage income, for which both the nominal
hourly wage, Wi,t, and the hours worked, hi,t, matter. The ﬁnal term in the ﬁrst row pertains to
the utility loss from working. An employed worker retains his job with probability 1−ϑ.I nt h e
next period, if he stays employed, he faces a probability γ that he will not be able to rebargain
the nominal wage rate, in which case his value is V E
t+1(Wi,t). Or he is able to rebargain, in which
case his value reﬂects the optimal rebargained wage in t+1: V E
t+1(W∗
t+1). With probability ϑ he
will be unemployed next period. The value of a worker when unemployed is given by










+Et {βt,t+1(1 − st)Ut+1}.
(21)
Here b are real unemployment beneﬁts. An unemployed worker has a chance of st of ﬁnding
a new job. In that case, he enters the same Calvo scheme as the average currently employed
worker. With probability (1 − γ) he can bargain over the wage in t + 1, with probability γ he
will start working at the average nominal hourly wage rate of existing contracts in t, Wt.T h e s e
assumptions ensure a suﬃcient degree of homogeneity across workers, which is needed to keep
the model tractable.
Let Δt(Wi,t): =V E
t (Wi,t)−Ut denote the family’s surplus from having a worker in employment
at wage Wi,t rather than having him unemployed. A few steps of algebra show that
Δt(Wi,t)=
Wi,t






























Firms are economically worthless when they separate from a worker. The market value of a
labor ﬁrm matched to a worker who receives a nominal hourly wage of Wi,t is given by
Jt(Wi,t)= Ψ L










t (Wi,t) are real per-period proﬁts of the ﬁrm when the nominal wage rate is Wi,t and hi,t









t is the competitive price for the labor good in real terms, Φ ≥ 0 denotes a per-period ﬁxed
cost of production. The second term in (23) reﬂects that ﬁrms which survive until the next17
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period are subject to Calvo staggering: only with a certain probability, 1 − γ, will they be able
to rebargain the hourly wage.
For those ﬁrms which bargain in a given period, nominal hourly wages are determined by means







where ηt ∈ (0,1) denotes the family’s bargaining power.12 The optimization above takes into
account that in each period each ﬁrm sets hours worked optimally according to the usual marginal




































Free entry into the vacancy posting market drives the value of a vacancy to zero. In equilibrium










The term in square brackets reﬂects our assumption that newly started jobs face the same
Calvo rigidities as incumbent jobs. This is similar to the assumptions made in Gertler and
Trigari (2006), who appeal to wage structures in multi-worker ﬁrms. With probability (1 − γ)
the ﬁrm-worker pair can reset its wage rate. With the remaining probability, the wage rate is
set to the average hourly wage rate prevailing in the previous period.13
2.4 Government: Monetary and Fiscal Policy
The monetary authority controls the one-month risk-free interest rate on nominal bonds, Rt.
The empirical literature (see, e.g. Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler, 2000) ﬁnds that simple generalized
12 Throughout the paper the bargaining power will be constant. The exception is Section 4.2 where variations in
the bargaining power are used to illustrate the existence, respectively absence of a wage channel under RTM
and EB.
13 Note that in our setup the assumption of wage stickiness of new hires is not essential for explaining unem-
ployment ﬂuctuations.18
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Taylor-type rules of the form



























once linearized, are a good representation of monetary policy in recent decades. Here Πa
t = Pt
Pt−12
is year-on-year inﬂation, and Π = 1 is the month-on-month gross target inﬂation rate. φR ∈







money) is an iid log-normal shock to the monetary
policy stance.
Government spending, gt, is exogenous and evolves according to:
log(gt) − log(g)=ρg(log(gt−1) − log(g)) + ζ
g
t ,




g). g is the government’s long-run target level for government







Rt−1 + gt. (29)
The government generates revenue from lump-sum taxes. It also earns income through new
debt issues, Dt
Pt . On the expenditure-side appear unemployment beneﬁts (the term involving b),
debt repayment and coupon as well as government spending. We assume that ﬁscal policy is
Ricardian.
2.5 Market Clearing
The aggregate retail good is used for private and government consumption. In addition, vacancy
posting activity requires resources and so do the ﬁxed costs of producing labor goods. Total
demand is thus given by
yt = ct + gt + κvt + ntΦ. (30)
Market clearing in the retail market requires that above demand of retail goods equals total







For each ﬁrm j in the wholesale sector, its supply yj,t = y
L,d
j,t , must be matched by the corre-





yt in order to clear the wholesale market.





j,t dj, where y
L,d
j,t marks demand for
the labor good by individual wholesale ﬁrm j. Market clearing requires that total demand for
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3 Calibration to the US
We calibrate the model to the US using data from 1964:q1 to 2006:q3. The sample start coincides
with the samples used in Gertler and Trigari (2006) and Krause and Lubik (2007). All data
are taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ database FRED II except for the Help
Wanted Advertising Index which was obtained from the Conference Board. We use the Hodrick-
Prescott ﬁlter with a conventional ﬁlter weight of 1,600 to extract the business cycle component
from the data in logs.
As to the underlying data, output is measured by nominal output in the business sector divided
by the GDP deﬂator. Total hours worked are hours worked in the business sector. Total wages
are the compensation in the business sector divided by the GDP deﬂator, and wages per employee
are obtained by dividing the former by the number of employees in the business sector. Real
hourly wages are measured by the real compensation per hour in the business sector, again
obtained by dividing the nominal quantity by the GDP deﬂator. Vacancies are measured by
the Conference Board’s index of Help-Wanted Advertising. We use the civilian unemployment
rate among those 16 years old and older. The inﬂation rate is the (quarter-on-quarter) GDP
inﬂation rate. The interest rate is the quarterly average of the FED Funds rate. We note that
both the interest rate and the inﬂation rate are not annualized in the ﬁgures reported below.
The model runs at a monthly frequency in order to be able to match stocks and ﬂows in the
US labor market. The calibrated parameter values and the targets are summarized in Table
1. Turning ﬁrst to preferences, the time-discount factor, β, is chosen so as to match an annual
real rate of 2.45%. The curvature of disutility of work, ϕ = 2, follows the estimates of Domeij
and Flod´ en (2006). The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, σ =1 .5, follows the estimates in
Smets and Wouters (2007). Habit persistence,  , is set to a value of 0.7, in line with Smets
and Wouters (2007). Scaling parameter κL is set so as to meet our target for hours worked per
employee of h = 1
3.
Turning to the labor good sector and the labor markets, we set α =0 .99, implying only mildly
decreasing returns to hours worked per worker. We set the elasticity of matches with respect to
unemployment to ξ =0 .5, which is in the range of reasonable values suggested by Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001). The bargaining power is set to a conventional value of η =0 .5. The
monthly separation rate of ϑ =0 .03 follows Shimer (2005). The degree of nominal rigidity of
wages is set to γ =0 .8. This amounts to the same contract duration for wages which we use
for prices, namely 5 months. This wage duration is roughly consistent with panel data when20
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Table 1: Parameters and theirc a librated values
Parameter Value Explanation; Target/Reference
Preferences
β 0.998 time-discount factor; matches annual real rate of 2.45 percent.
ϕ 2 labor supply elasticity of 0.5; Domeij and Flod´ en (2006).
σ 1.50 risk aversion; Smets and Wouters (2007).
  0.70 external habit persistence; Smets and Wouters (2007).
κL 372.31 scaling factor to disutility of work; targets h =1 /3.
Bargaining and Labor Good
α 0.99 labor elasticity of production; close to constant returns to scale.
ξ 0.50 elasticity of matches w.r.t. unempl.; Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
η 0.50 bargaining power of workers; conventional value.
ϑ 0.03 monthly rate of separation; Shimer (2005).
γ 0.80 avg. duration of wages of 5 mths; same stickiness as for prices.
σm 0.398 eﬃciency of matching; reconciles m with target for u, q.
κ 0.0051 vacancy posting costs; reconciles m with target for u, q.
z 3.1526 technology; targets output y =1 .
Φ 0.0092 ﬁxed cost associated with labor; targets std( ut).
Wholesale Sector
  11 markup; conventional price-markup of 10 percent over marginal costs.
ω 0.80 Calvo stickiness of prices; avg. duration of 5 months; Bils and Klenow (2004).
Government
φπ 1.50 response to inﬂation; conventional Taylor rule.
φy 0.50 response to output; conventional Taylor rule.
φR 0.85
1
3 interest rate smoothing; 0.85 at quarterly frequency.
g 0.347 government spending; targets consumption-GDP ratio of 0.65.
b 0.3825 unemployment beneﬁts; targets replacement rate b
wh =0 .4.
Correlation of Shocks and Size of Innovations
ρg 0.89 autocorr. of government spending; 0.79 in quarterly data.
ρz 0.82 autocorr. of technology shock; 0.67 in quarterly data.
(identiﬁed using the model’s resource constraint).
ρb 0.95 autocorr. of premium shock; 0.90 in quarterly terms.
σmoney 0.043 standard deviation of innovation to Taylor rule; data.
σg 0.674 std. dev. of innov. to gov. spending; match std. dev. (0.87) in qtrly data.
σz 0.571 std. dev. of innov. to tech. shock; match std. dev. of techn.(0.69) in qtrly data.
σb 0.102 std. dev. of innov. to premium shock; targets std( yt).
Notes: The Table reports calibrated parameter values. The model is calibrated to the US using data from 1964:q1
to 2006:q3; see the main text for details. As to the shocks, the government spending and technology shocks are
estimated using quarterly data. The autocorrelation coeﬃcients and the standard deviation of the respective
innovation at a monthly frequency were chosen such that the resulting series would imply the same ﬁrst-order
autocorrelation coeﬃcient and the same standard deviation as the quarterly estimates if the monthly series were
to be time-aggregated to a quarterly frequency. See the main text for details.21
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not adjusting for possible reporting errors, cp. Gottschalk (2005). The same author, however,
also shows that the duration of wage contracts considerably increases when eliminating possibly
spurious statements. Doing so, the hazard rate of a wage change peaks at 12 months, leading
us to consider also more wage rigidity in the impulse responses reported in Section 4.
As regards the labor market steady state, we target an unemployment rate of u =0 .0588 in
line with the data average and a quarterly probability of ﬁnding a worker of 70%. The latter
ﬁgure follows den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) and implies a monthly job ﬁlling probability
of q =0 .33. The eﬃciency parameter of the matching function is set to σm =0 .398 in order
to match the above two assumptions regarding the labor market steady state. With the same
target, the cost of posting a vacancy is set to κ =0 .0051. The technology parameter is set to
z =3 .152, which ensures that output is equal to unity in steady state. All steady state values
reported can thus be interpreted as ratios to GDP.
We calibrate the ﬁxed costs to Φ = 0.0092. This amounts to 0.86% of steady state output of an
individual labor ﬁrm being absorbed by ﬁxed costs or, alternatively, 0.95% of the value of its
revenue. In choosing this number, we target the degree of ﬂuctuations in unemployment in the
data.14
The markup in the wholesale sector is set to a conventional value of 10%, implying   = 11.
Following Bils and Klenow (2004) the average contract duration of prices is set to 5 months, so
ω =0 .8.
We rely on a monthly adaptation of a standard Taylor rule (i.e. a long-run response to inﬂation
with φπ =1 .5 and to output with φy =0 .5), with the coeﬃcient on interest rate smoothing
being set to φR =0 .851/3. This roughly corresponds to a quarterly interest rate smoothing
coeﬃcient of 0.85 which is standard in the literature. In order to determine the steady state
level of “government spending”, we target a consumption output ratio of 65% which is the data
average over the sample period. We take c/(c + g) as the model counterpart of this ratio. By
this and equation, (30) g =0 .347 (some resources are also used for vacancy posting costs and for
job-related ﬁxed costs). We target a steady state replacement rate of b
wh =0 .4, a conventional
14 To obtain empirical evidence for the size of overhead labor costs, Ramey (1991) uses the proportion of non-
productive workers in total manufacturing employment as a proxy. Using BLS data from 1985 to 2006 the
proportion of non-productive workers varies between 27 and 30 percent. Basu (1996) argues that even higher
values are plausible if more general overhead costs would be taken into account. These numbers, though
indicative of possibly substantial ﬁx costs, are not directly interpretable as parameter Φ in our calibration but
rather constitute upper bounds. In our model, Φ indicates costs which are ﬁxed with respect to hours worked
per employee. The measures just cited deﬁne ﬁxed costs more broadly and also include costs which are to a
certain extent ﬁxed with respect to the number of employees, for example.22
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value which is used for example in Shimer (2005) and which is close to the evidence reported in
Engen and Gruber (2001). Our target for the replacement rate implies b =0 .382.
The resulting steady state for some of the model variables is reported in Table 2. As argued,
Table 2: Steady State
Variable Value Description
y 1o u t p u t .
c 0.6439 consumption.
wh 0.9562 wage per employee.
u 0.0588 unemployment rate.
v 0.0854 vacancies (as share of labor force).
s 0.4802 probability of ﬁnding a job within a month.
q 0.3306 probability of ﬁnding a worker within a month.
b/(wh) 0.40 unemployment insurance replacement rate.
κv/y · 100 0.0432 percent share of output lost to vacancy posting.
Φ/(xLzhα) 0.0095 share of a labor ﬁrm’s revenue lost to ﬁxed costs.
ΨC/y 0.0909 proﬁt share (wholesale sector) in total output.
ΨLn/y 0.0005 proﬁt share (labor sector) in total output.
J 0.0153 value of a labor ﬁrm.
Δ 0.3589 surplus of the worker from working.
Notes: Steady state for some variables implied by the calibration in Table 1.
proﬁts in the labor sector are small. As a result, the value of labor ﬁrms, J, amounts to only
1.5% of monthly output. The surplus of workers is an order of magnitude larger, Δ = 0.3589,
which amounts to around 38 percent of the monthly wage per employee. This has implications
for the elasticity of unemployment with respect to beneﬁts, on which Section 4.4 will comment.
Returning to the calibration, the technology process is modeled as an AR(1) process, so  zt =
ρz zt−1 + ζz




z). We ﬁrst use the model’s inverted production function  zt =  yt −

α ht +  nt

to identify the time series for the technology shock from the data as follows. Time-
aggregation implies that  z
q










, where superscript q denotes quarterly averages
and time index tq indicates that one time step is one quarter.15 The monthly autocorrelation
parameter, ρz, and the standard deviation of the innovation, σz, are then obtained as follows.




3 ( y2005:m1 +  y2005:m2 +  y2005:m3).23
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ordinary least squares. Here  z
q
tq−1 denotes the average of the technology shock during the
previous quarter. We then choose ρz and σz such that the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of the
quarterly average of this monthly technology process matches the counterparts in the estimated
quarterly process.
Government spending is represented by an AR(1) process estimated on the HP(1,600) ﬁltered
government consumption data for the sample period (detrended by the GDP deﬂator). Just as
with the technology shock, we adjust the autocorrelation parameter and the standard deviation
of the innovation in the model in such a way, that the monthly series for government spending
once aggregated to quarterly numbers would ﬁt the serial correlation and standard deviation as
estimated from the quarterly data.
The standard deviation of the monetary policy shock is obtained as follows. We obtain the
residual (plus a constant term) by using actual data in Taylor rule (28). We use monthly
observations of the Federal funds rate and its one month lagged value. The one month lagged
year-on-year GDP inﬂation rate in that formula is proxied for by year-on-year CPI inﬂation,
which is available at a monthly frequency. The deviation of output from steady state in each
month of the sample is proxied by the seasonal component of hp(14,400) ﬁltered data of the
index of industrial production. The standard deviation, σmoney, is computed as the standard
deviation of the residual in (28) such obtained.
Finally, the standard deviation of the risk premium shock is set such that the standard deviation
of the output series in our model coincides with the standard deviation of hp-ﬁltered output in
the data. This implies σb =0 .102. The serial correlation of the risk premium shock is set to
0.95, which translates into an autocorrelation of a quarterly aggregate of this shock of around
0.9.
Table 3 shows the second moments of endogenous variables as implied by the model, namely
unconditional standard deviations, the contemporaneous correlation with output as well as the
serial correlation coeﬃcients. This information can be compared to the moments implied by the
d a t aw h i c ha r eg i v e ni nb r a c k e t s .
The model captures both the standard deviations and the overall co-movement in the data. The
compensation per employee is still more volatile than in the data, while real hourly wages are not
volatile enough. As a consequence, total hours worked and, especially, hours per worker ﬂuctuate
more than their counterparts in the data. Most importantly, however, the model reproduces24
ECB
Working Paper Series No 923
August 2008
Table 3: Second Moments of the Model compared to the data
Variable Meaning std std to std(y)c o r r w i t h y AR(1)
 yt output 1.91 (1.92) 1.00 (1.00) 1.00 (1.00) 0.92 (0.86)
 Rt nominal rate 0.41 (0.41) 0.21 (0.21) 0.02 (0.37) 0.89 (0.83)
 Πt inﬂation 0.23 (0.29) 0.12 (0.15) 0.21 (0.15) 0.36 (0.47)
 ht +  nt total hours 2.08 (1.74) 1.09 (0.91) 0.89 (0.88) 0.87 (0.92)
 wt + ht +  nt total compensation 2.00 (1.90) 1.05 (0.99) 0.95 (0.85) 0.87 (0.91)
 wt + ht compens. per empl. 1.37 (0.90) 0.72 (0.47) 0.90 (0.49) 0.82 (0.81)
 ht hours per worker 1.49 (0.49) 0.78 (0.25) 0.79 (0.72) 0.82 (0.77)
 wt hourly compensation 0.43 (0.85) 0.22 (0.45) 0.09 (0.11) 0.88 (0.78)
 ut unemployment 10.93 (11.01) 5.74 (5.74) -0.98 (-0.87) 0.91 (0.92)
 vt vacancies 13.77 (13.15) 7.23 (6.85) 0.88 (0.90) 0.76 (0.91)
Notes: The Table reports summary statistics of the model and compares those to the data (values in the data are
given in brackets). All statistics refer to the variables being measured at a quarterly frequency. Model variables
are averaged/aggregated over the quarter so as to bring their measurement in line with the data. The data
are hp(1,600) ﬁltered. The third column reports the standard deviation of the series, the fourth its standard
deviation relative to that of GDP. The ﬁfth column shows the contemporaneous cross-correlation with GDP. The
ﬁnal column reports ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcients. These refer to the autocorrelation measured quarter
on quarter. The computations for the data are performed on the sample from 1964:q1 to 2006:q3.
the substantial ﬂuctuations in unemployment and vacancies in the data. In percentage terms
wages per employee are only about 3/4 as volatile as output in the data. Yet the model matches
the unemployment ﬂuctuations despite the tight link that, in the right-to-manage model, exists
between labor proﬁts and the relatively smooth wages per employee.
Using this calibration, we next turn to illustrating the wage channel to inﬂation, the importance
of the per-period ﬁxed costs associated with jobs and the implications of the model for the
response of unemployment to changes in beneﬁts.
4 Wage Channel, Unemployment Fluctuations and Beneﬁts
In the Introduction we identiﬁed three main features of our model: (a) that the model contains a
proper wage channel, (b) that it reproduces the ﬂuctuations of unemployment over the business
cycle and (c) that it implies a reasonable elasticity of steady state unemployment with respect
to changes in beneﬁts.25
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This Section analyzes the three features in detail: Subsection 4.1 presents key equations of
the model to illustrate the model’s wage channel and to explain the mechanism which induces
unemployment ﬂuctuations. A wage channel, in our understanding, is present whenever wages
and the wage-setting process have a direct inﬂuence on inﬂation. In our model this materializes
itself primarily in two observations which we corroborate in Subsection 4.2: First, a higher degree
of wage rigidity induces a weaker response of inﬂation to aggregate shocks. Second, higher wages
all else equal translate directly into higher inﬂation. We note that this is the case even if a shock
to wages does not aﬀect the wages of prospective new hires but only aﬀects the wages of existing
matches. Subsection 4.2 also clariﬁes in which respect these deﬁning characteristics of the wage
channel are present under right-to-manage bargaining (RTM) but not under eﬃcient bargaining
(EB). Moving to point (b) above, Table 3 already showed that the model can reproduce the
ﬂuctuations of unemployment over the business cycle under a suitable calibration. Subsection
4.3 makes clear that the value of ﬁxed costs is crucial for this result. Finally, Subsection 4.4
examines by how much unemployment would rise in the long-run if unemployment beneﬁts were
to rise in our model environment.
4.1 Wage Channel and Unemployment Fluctuations – Key Equations
This Subsection builds intuition for why there exists a wage channel in our model economy and
for why ﬁxed labor costs are important for unemployment ﬂuctuations in the model. In order to
keep the exposition tractable and clear, in this Subsection we abstract from wage rigidity and
set the wage stickiness parameter γ to zero. Therefore all ﬁrms pay the same wage rate and
all workers work the same number of hours. This allows us to drop superscript ∗ and subscript
index i in the following exposition. Under RTM, workers and ﬁrms bargain only about the
hourly wage. At this wage rate a labor ﬁrm faces a perfectly elastic labor supply. The ﬁrst-





16 Under eﬃcient bargaining, a ﬁrm and a worker jointly bargain over the wage and hours worked:
argmaxwt,ht [Δt]
ηt [Jt]
1−ηt. The corresponding ﬁrst-order conditions under eﬃcient bargaining are as fol-








λt . Under EB hours are set
so as to equate the marginal value product of labor and the worker’s marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and consumption. Average wages therefore do not directly inﬂuence production and thus they do not
play a direct role in inﬂuencing marginal costs of price-setting ﬁrms under EB.26
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Since the marginal cost of a price-setting ﬁrm is mct = xL
t and zthα
t = yL









Equation (31) implies that higher wages all else equal induce higher marginal costs – and thus
inﬂation – and that stickiness in wages all else equal translates into stickiness of the marginal
costs of price-setting ﬁrms. This stickiness translates into a muted response of inﬂation to shocks
(when compared to a model with more ﬂexible wages) via the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
Wages and anything aﬀecting the wage-setting process thereby have a direct eﬀect on inﬂation.
We next clarify the relation between the introduction of a period-by-period ﬁxed cost associated
with jobs, Φ, and the ﬂuctuation of unemployment over the business cycle. Under the assumption
of no wage rigidity, vacancy posting condition (27) simpliﬁes to
κ = qtEt {βt,t+1Jt+1}. (32)
Using this in the deﬁnition of the market value of the ﬁrm (the simpliﬁed version of (23))
yields an expression for Jt which depends on contemporaneous variables only. Reinserting this













Linearizing that around the steady state, one obtains









− β(1 − ϑ)Et { qt+1}.
There is, neglecting ﬂuctuations in the pricing kernel, a one-to-one relationship between percent-





, and percentage ﬂuctuations in
the probability of ﬁnding a worker,  qt. The more per-period proﬁts react to the business cycle,
the more will the vacancy posting activity react to the business cycle – and thus the more will
unemployment react.
Fixed costs in period proﬁts amplify ﬂuctuations in labor proﬁts in percentage terms. The
revenue of a labor ﬁrm is given by xL
t zthα
t . Using the ﬁrst-order condition for hours worked,
αxL
t zthα
t = wtht,t h es h a r eo frevenue of the ﬁrm that is paid to labor is given by α ∈ (0,1)






wtht − Φ. (33)27
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Once ﬁxed costs associated with a job are positive, wage costs are still proportional to revenue
as in the previous literature, e.g. Trigari (2006), but they are no longer proportional to proﬁts.
Percentage ﬂuctuations in proﬁts can then be larger than percentage ﬂuctuations in wages. In




 wt +  ht

, where A ≥ 1. (34)
In percentage terms, ﬂuctuations in labor proﬁts are linked to percentage ﬂuctuations in wages




α wh−Φ which is larger than unity if Φ > 0.
For any given level of ﬂuctuations in wages per employee, labor proﬁts associated with a job will
be the more volatile in percentage terms, the more the ﬁxed costs consume of a ﬁrm’s revenue.
With a suitable choice of calibration for the size of ﬁxed costs Φ, unemployment rates exhibit
the desired amplitude over the business cycle. In our calibration A =1 9 .72.
4.2 The Wage Channel – Simulations
We next turn to graphically illustrate the wage channel. Figure 1 shows impulse responses
to a monetary policy shock for diﬀerent degrees of nominal wage rigidity. All graphs refer to
variables measured at the monthly frequency implied by the model. The black solid line marks
the baseline calibration which features a wage rigidity parameter of γ =0 .8 implying an average
wage duration of 5 months. The red dashed line shows impulse responses in an economy with
lower wage rigidity (γ =0 .5, so wages are optimized on average every second month). A blue
dotted line reports the impulse responses when γ =1 1 /12, which implies an average wage
duration of 12 months. The response of the real wage rate,  wt, to a monetary tightening is
less pronounced when nominal wages are more rigid.17 As a consequence also inﬂation falls less
sharply – illustrating one of the deﬁning properties of the wage channel. The same is not true
under eﬃcient bargaining (EB), as Krause and Lubik (2007) show.18
Figure 2 illustrates that in our model with RTM all else equal higher wages directly induce higher
inﬂation while again this is not the case under EB. In the simulation underlying the Figure the
bargaining power of workers unexpectedly rises from η =0 .5t oη =0 .6i nt = 0. The bargaining
17 With γ =1 1 /12 nominal wages are more rigid than prices. Despite falling nominal wages (see bottom right
panel in Figure 1), real wages can therefore rise. Inﬂation nevertheless falls since marginal costs are given by
 mct =  wt −

 zt +( α − 1) ht

and since hours worked per employee fall (bottom left panel).
18 The reason being that under EB in equilibrium marginal costs are related to the marginal rate of substitution
of the worker between consumption and leisure and not to the wage rate, cf. also Footnote 16.28
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock – the Eﬀect of Wage Rigidity
Output,  yt Inﬂation,  Πt Nominal Rate,  Rt


















Unemployment Rate,  ut Vacancies,  vt Labor Proﬁts,  ΨL
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Hours per worker,  ht Real Wage per Hour,  wt Nominal Wage Inﬂation,  ΠW
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Notes: The Figure shows percentage responses (1 in the plots corresponds to a 1% increase over the
respective steady state value) of endogenous variables to a one percent monetary policy shock. All
variables are measured at a monthly frequency. A time period in the graphs is one month. The black solid
line marks the calibrated benchmark model (the average contract duration is 5 months). The red dashed
line shows the case of lower wage rigidity (the average contract duration is 2 months). The blue dotted
line corresponds to the case of higher wage rigidity (the average contract duration is 12 months). The
wage rigidity in the model is a rigidity in nominal hourly wage rates. Nominal wage inﬂation is deﬁned
as  Π
W
t :=  (Wt/Wt−1).29
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Figure 2: Increase in Bargaining Power – Right-to-manage vs. Eﬃcient Bargaining
Output,  yt Unempl. Rate,  ut Real Wage Rate,  wt Inﬂation,  Πt


















Notes: The Figure shows percentage responses to a one-time increase in the worker’s bargaining power. The workers’
bargaining power increases from 0.5 to 0.6 in t = 0. All variables are measured at a monthly frequency. A black solid
line refers to the benchmark model under right-to-manage bargaining. The red dashed line reports impulse responses
for the same model but with eﬃcient bargaining. For comparability, both models do not feature any nominal wage
rigidity (γ = 0). The calibration for EB uses the same targets as the calibration for RTM in Table 1. See Table 5 in
the Appendix for the steady state and the parameters under EB.
power is known to return to its steady state level, η =0 .5, for all following periods. We abstract
from wage rigidity.19 Under both bargaining schemes the rise in the bargaining power of workers
triggers a sharp increase in hourly wages. Under RTM this immediately translates into a rise
in inﬂation, just as equation (31) would have suggested (black solid line). As a consequence of
the monetary tightening, output falls and employment falls in subsequent periods, too. This
response of inﬂation is absent under EB (red dashed line) where movements in wages, unless they
aﬀect the hiring decisions of ﬁrms, aﬀect nothing else but the distribution of the joint surplus of
workers and ﬁrms. In above scenario, the bargaining power rises only in period t =0 ,s ot h e r e
is no eﬀect on future wages and proﬁts. The vacancy posting decisions today are therefore not
aﬀected under EB. As a consequence, even though wages of 94% of the labor force sharply rise
in t = 0, under EB there is no eﬀect on inﬂation.20
19 The very purpose of Figure 2, and also of Figure 3, is to show that under EB wages aﬀect inﬂation only to the
extent that they aﬀect employment while under RTM there exists a direct channel from wages to inﬂation.
For technical reasons, in this paper we do not distinguish between wage rigidity for existing hires and wage
rigidity for new hires, but rather assume similar wage rigidity for all matches. Under RTM, whether wage
rigidity aﬀects all matches or only existing matches hardly aﬀects results, see e.g. Christoﬀel et al. (2008). In
contrast, under EB results would be aﬀected. Wage rigidity modeled the way we do would lead to spill-overs
from wages of existing matches to the surplus of new matches. It would thus cause spill-overs to employment
even if the bargaining shock itself only aﬀects existing matches.
20 Appendix A.3 reports details for the steady state and the linearized model underlying the impulse responses
with EB.30
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These results do not rest on the lack of persistence of the bargaining power shock in Figure
2. Instead, under EB even a persistent “wage shock” may not aﬀect production and inﬂation.
Unless the shock aﬀects the bargaining of prospective new matches, under EB there is no impact
on the price of the labor good, xL
t , and therefore no impact on marginal costs or on inﬂation.
Figure 3 illustrates this claim, assuming that the bargaining power shock is persistent. The
Figure 3: Persistent Increase in Bargaining Power – New vs. Existing Matches
Eﬃcient bargaining
Output,  yt Unempl. Rate,  ut Avg. Real Wage,  wt Inﬂation,  Πt






















Output,  yt Unempl. Rate,  ut Avg. Real Wage,  wt Inﬂation,  Πt























Notes: The Figure shows percentage responses to a persistent increase in the worker’s bargaining power. The
workers’ bargaining power increases from 0.5 to 0.6 under the baseline calibration in month 0 and stays at 0.55
in month 1, returning to baseline thereafter. As of month 0, the bargaining power in month 1 is known. A time
period in the graphs is one month. The ﬁrst row of panels refers to eﬃcient bargaining. A red dashed line reports
impulse responses for the model with eﬃcient bargaining when only matches formed prior to t =0a r es u b j e c tt o
the bargaining power shock. A dotted green lined marked by squares indicates the response under EB when also
those matches which were newly formed in t = 0 are subject to the t = 1 bargaining power shock. The second row
of panels refers to the model with right-to-manage bargaining. A black solid line refers to the benchmark model
under right-to-manage bargaining when only matches formed prior to t = 0 (”existing” matches) are subject to the
bargaining power shock. Blue crosses mark the model with RTM bargaining when also those matches which were
formed in t = 0 (so also ”new” matches) are subject to the t = 1 bargaining power shock. Both the RTM and the
EB model do not feature nominal wage rigidity (γ =0 ) .
bargaining power rises to η =0 .6i nt = 0 and is known as of t = 0 to be still halfway between
that level and the baseline in t = 1. The bargaining power returns to the baseline thereafter31
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(from t =2o n w a r d s ). We ﬁrst assume that only the bargaining power of workers in matches
that already produce in t = 0 is aﬀected. Under eﬃcient bargaining this persistent bargaining
shock, which aﬀects the wages of 94% of the labor force in t = 0 and of 91% of the labor force in
t = 1, does not have any bearing on inﬂation (see the red dashed line in the ﬁrst row of panels in
Figure 3). We next explore the case in which the bargaining power shock aﬀects the bargaining
of all matches, including those who start to work only in t = 1. The responses under EB change
considerably (cp. the green squares to the red dashed line). In this scenario, ﬁrms anticipate
the eﬀect of the bargaining power shock on proﬁts associated with new matches in t = 1. Hiring
incentives therefore worsen in t = 0, so that employment falls in t = 1 and unemployment rises.
As a result the costs for the labor good rise. This increase in the cost of the labor good implies
that the bargaining shock is aﬀecting inﬂation also under the EB regime. It is important to note
that this eﬀect is only present if the bargaining shock aﬀects the hiring decision of ﬁrms.
These diﬀerences are in stark contrast to RTM, cp. the second row in Figure 3. A black solid line
marks responses under RTM when the bargaining power shock, which still is persistent, only
aﬀects existing matches. Blue crosses mark the response when all matches (including ”new”
matches) are aﬀected. As these lines illustrate, under RTM, responses do not qualitatively
depend on the distinction whether only existing matches or also new matches are aﬀected by a
wage shock. In both cases, wages rise and also inﬂation rises.
In sum, the impulse responses show that the RTM model features a direct channel from wages
to inﬂation. Under EB, in contrast, there is no direct wage channel. If under EB wages aﬀect
inﬂation, they do so only indirectly via their potential eﬀect on employment. Under EB wages
thus aﬀect inﬂation only to the extent that they aﬀect employment in the ﬁrst place.21
4.3 The Role of Fixed Costs – Simulations
Figure 4 shows impulse responses to a monetary policy shock for various values of the job-related
ﬁxed cost, Φ (with wage ridigity “switched on” again). The calibrated model is shown as a black
solid line. The red dashed line shows the case without ﬁxed costs.
While the responses of output, interest rates and inﬂation are hardly aﬀected by the size of Φ,
the response of the unemployment rate is dampened by a factor of two and a half when no ﬁxed
costs are present.22 Much of the response of employment instead shifts towards a reduction at
21 Even though the direct eﬀect of wages on inﬂation is quite diﬀerent in the two bargaining schemes, the two
schemes may still imply similar equilibrium behavior of endogenous variables for some types of shocks as some
of the impulse responses in Figure 3 suggest.32
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock - the Eﬀect of Fixed Costs
Output,  yt Inﬂation,  Πt Nominal Rate,  Rt
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Notes: The Figure shows percentage responses (1 in the plots corresponds to a 1% increase over the respective
steady state value) of endogenous variables to a one percent monetary policy shock. All variables are measured
at a monthly frequency. A time period in the graphs is one month. The black solid line marks the calibrated
benchmark model (ﬁxed costs Φ = 0.0092). The calibration implies a factor of proportionality A =1 9 .72.
The red dashed line shows the case of no ﬁxed costs, so A = 1. The green dashed-dotted line, which lies
inbetween these two, corresponds to the intermediate case with ﬁxed costs Φ = 0.0087 implying a factor of
proportionality of A = 10.
22 As in the previous Figures, the response of the unemployment rate,  ut, corresponds to the percent increase of
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the intensive margin (hours worked per employee fall by more). As an intermediate case, Figure
4 also shows impulse responses when the factor of proportionality is halfway between the two
cases just shown. This case sets Φ = 0.0087, implying A = 10 (green dashed-dotted line).23
In line with the intuition underlying equation (34), unemployment reacts by more than in the
complete absence of ﬁxed costs but still a long way less than in our model calibrated to the US
data.
Table 4 corroborates this result. The model underlying this Table relies on RTM and the
same calibration as used so far but does not account for job-related ﬁxed costs, so Φ = 0.
Similar to Table 3 it compares the second moments in the model under this calibration to their
counterparts in the data. The standard deviation of output, the contemporaneous correlation of
unemployment and vacancies with output as well as the serial correlation properties of output,
unemployment rates and vacancies are hardly aﬀected when removing job-related ﬁxed costs.
However, in the absence of ﬁxed costs the right-to-manage model fails to reproduce the amplitude
of ﬂuctuations of both unemployment and vacancies over the business cycle by a wide margin
(cp. column “std”). We conclude that the ﬁxed costs are instrumental for amplifying the eﬀect
of shocks on unemployment in the model.
Table 4: Second Moments of the Model - No Fix Costs
Variable Meaning std std to std(y)c o r r w i t h y AR(1)
 yt output 1.89 (1.92) 1.00 (1.00) 1.00 (1.00) 0.92 (0.86)
 ut unemployment 3.48 (11.01) 1.84 (5.74) -0.97 (-0.87) 0.90 (0.92)
 vt vacancies 4.43 (13.15) 2.35 (6.85) 0.84 (0.90) 0.74 (0.91)
Notes: Same as Table 3 except that the model does not feature period-by-period ﬁxed costs (Φ = 0, so A =1 ) .
The Table reports summary statistics of the model and compares those to the data (values in brackets). Refer to
Table 3 for details.
4.4 The Elasticity of Unemployment with Respect to Beneﬁts
When calibrating the textbook search and matching model with EB in a way that ensures
low steady state proﬁts associated with jobs, the resulting model generates reasonably strong
variations of unemployment over the business cycle, e.g. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007). Under




α wh−Φ ≥ 1 as ﬁx costs Φ rise towards their upper bound.34
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EB, such a calibration additionally implies that workers are close to indiﬀerent between taking up
work and entering unemployment. Small changes in beneﬁts can then have a large eﬀect on the
incentives to work for a given wage. As a consequence, these calibrations tend to imply a large
drop of the unemployment rate when beneﬁts are reduced. The latter observations have lead
some authors, notably Costain and Reiter (2008) and Mortensen and Nagypal (2007), to question
the underlying mechanism which leads to the ampliﬁcation of unemployment ﬂuctuations over
the cycle. The current Subsection shows that the RTM model with ﬁxed costs as calibrated in
Section 3 is not subject to the same criticism.
Under both RTM and EB, the ﬁrst-order condition for the bargained wage can be expressed as
a suitably modiﬁed surplus sharing rule:
ηtJ∗
t δW




t gives the rise in worker surplus when hourly wages rise, while δF
t gives the fall in the
ﬁrm’s proﬁts when the wage rises. Under EB, δW
t = δF
t in every period and especially in steady
state. As argued above, since ηJ =( 1− η)Δ, EB implies that whenever the value of labor
ﬁrms is small (as it needs to be to achieve suﬃcient ﬂuctuations of unemployment) the worker’s
surplus needs to be small, too.
This is not the case under RTM, where typically the worker’s gain and the ﬁrm’s loss from a













If in steady state the worker’s marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption
exceeds the wage rate, the term in square brackets exceeds unity. As a result, a higher value
obtains for the worker’s surplus, Δ, than under EB – for any value of a labor ﬁrm, J, and for
any parametrization for the bargaining power of workers.24 In particular, for the calibration of
the RTM model to US data discussed in Section 3 the model yields the following values in the














24 The condition mrs > w is not special to RTM but also holds for the calibration with EB used in Figure 2,
cf. Table 5 in the Appendix. In fact, under EB, as α → 1, mrs > w becomes a necessary condition for positive
ex-post proﬁts of labor ﬁrms and thus for the existence of an equilibrium with positive hiring costs.35
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In that calibration, labor ﬁrms’ proﬁts in steady state, ΨL, are just a small 0.05% percent of
the value of their revenue. This implies that the value of a job to a labor ﬁrm in steady state
is as low as J =0 .015, or 1.5% of a month’s output. The job, however, is valued much more
by the worker. The worker’s surplus is an order of magnitude larger than the value of the labor
ﬁrm, with Δ = 0.36 corresponding to roughly 38% of a worker’s wage per month.
As a result, an increase in beneﬁts does not cause a dramatic rise in steady state unemployment
rates: increasing the replacement rate, b
wh, from 40% to 41% in the calibrated economy with
RTM raises the unemployment rate in the long-run by 1.11% (from 5.88 pp. to 5.95 pp.). This
is an order of magnitude lower than the values reported for EB by Costain and Reiter (2008)
and well in line with the empirical literature. For purposes of comparison, for example, Nickell
and Layard (1999) ﬁnd that this semi-elasticity of the unemployment rate with respect to the
replacement rate is 1.3, while Costain and Reiter (2008) favor a value of 2.25 We view this
property of the model as a further argument in favor of considering RTM instead of EB in
models with unemployment ﬂuctuations.26
5 Conclusions and Outlook
The current paper has presented a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions
which (a) in many elements is similar in structure to policy-models without equilibrium un-
employment. Most importantly, the model implies a wage channel to inﬂation, which is one
of the central features of policy-models used at central banks. The model (b) is empirically
successful in reproducing the pronounced ﬂuctuations of unemployment over the business cycle.
Towards this aim, the model accounts for ﬁxed costs associated with maintaining an existing
job. Job-related ﬁxed costs amplify the ﬂuctuations in proﬁts (need to be volatile) in the model
for any given ﬂuctuation in wages (which are smooth). While our calibration relies on low proﬁts
associated with jobs in steady state, it does not at the same time demand a small gap between
the value of working and the value of unemployment for the worker. The model presented in
25 We are not the ﬁrst to highlight the qualitative diﬀerences of the right-to-manage and the eﬃcient bargaining
approaches when it comes to the eﬀect of structural reforms, see for example Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003).
26 Not least due to the absence of the wage channel under EB, inﬂation behaves diﬀerently than under RTM.
In general equilibrium, this in turn translates into the size of ﬂuctuations of unemployment which would be
the target for identifying the size of ﬁxed costs, Φ. In order to abstract from these complications which
arise only in a New Keynesian model environment, in a companion note to the current paper, Christoﬀel and
Kuester (2007), we use an RBC setup to compare the implied elasticity of unemployment beneﬁts to changes
in replacement rates under right-to-manage and eﬃcient bargaining, and conﬁrm above results.36
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this paper therefore (c) implies reasonable comparative statics in the labor market: Steady state
unemployment does not change tremendously when unemployment beneﬁts rise, meaning that
the size of the change is in line with empirical evidence.
The model is based on Trigari’s (2006) right-to-manage (RTM) formulation and shares some
properties with the recent literature using search and matching frictions but eﬃcient wage
bargaining, cp. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007). Namely, in order to reproduce the size of
unemployment ﬂuctuations over the business cycle, steady state proﬁts of labor ﬁrms need to be
small and wages must not move one-to-one with proﬁts. Yet, this is just how far the similarities
go. Most notably, the unemployment ﬂuctuation mechanism does not rely on smooth wages
or on a high outside option of the worker. It does, especially, not require that entry-wages do
respond little to the business cycle. This is important since sticky wages of new hires have
received only limited empirical blessing recently, see Pissarides (2007) and Haefke, Sonntag, and
van Rens (2007).
The combination of right-to-manage bargaining and ﬁxed costs thus brings back to life the wage
channel in a model with a realistic degree of unemployment ﬂuctuations and a realistic response
of unemployment to changes in the beneﬁt level as our calibration to US data illustrates. With
the wage channel alive and well, we believe, it is time to explore the inclusion of this mechanism
in a larger-scale policy model – and to check the robustness of policy advice derived under the
alternative bargaining schemes.
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A Steady State and Linearized Economy
The Appendix presents the steady state of our model economy with RTM bargaining, and the
equilibrium conditions linearized around steady state. For completeness, we also present the
steady state equations and linearized equilibrium conditions for the eﬃcient bargaining model
used for Figures 2 and 3.39
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A.1 Steady State
We turn to present the steady state of the model economy with RTM bargaining. Variables









Πa =4 Π .
Marginal utility of consumption:
λ =( c −  c)
−σ .
Marginal cost and price of labor good:
mc = xL =



















Wage bargaining ﬁrst-order condition:
ηJδW =( 1− η)ΔδF. (35)
δF =
1
















w = xLzαhα−1. (38)
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Value of labor ﬁrm:
J =
1







Surplus of representative family:
Δ=
1
1 − β(1 − ϑ − s)






Vacancy posting - zero proﬁt condition:
κ = qβJ.
Resource constraint:
y = c + g + κv +Φ n.
Production:
y = nzhα.
Period proﬁt of a labor ﬁrm:
ΨL = xLzhα − wh − Φ.
Period proﬁt of a goods diﬀerentiation ﬁrm:
ΨC =( 1− mc)y.
A.2 Linearized Model Economy
This Subsection presents the linearized model economy.
Consumption Euler equation:
 λt = Et

 λt+1 +  Rt +   b
t −  Πt+1

,
where  λt = − σ
1−  ( ct −   ct−1).
New Keynesian Phillips curve:





(1 − ω)(1 − ωβ)
ω
 mct,
where  mct =  xL
t .
Matching:
 mt = ξ ut +( 1− ξ) vt.
Employment stock:




Link employment to unemployment:




Probability of ﬁnding a worker:
 qt =  mt −  vt.41
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Probability ofﬁ nding a job:
 st =  mt −  ut.
Bargaining ﬁrst-order condition for the wage rate:
 J∗
t +  δ W
t =  Δ∗





Aggregate hours index (from hours ﬁrst=order conditions):
 xL
t +  zt +( α − 1) ht =  wt. (41)
Evolution of aggregate real wage:
 wt = γ

 wt−1 −  Πt

+( 1− γ) w∗
t. (42)
Law of motion of  δF
t :
 δF
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Market clearing:
y  yt = c ct + g  gt + κv vt +Φn nt.
Aggregate production:
 yt =  zt + α ht +  nt.






α wh − Φ
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+   
money
t .
Law of motion of the shocks:
  b











































Model Underlying Figure 3
For Figure 3, we distinguish  Jt,  Δt,  δW
t ,  δF
t ,  ht and  w∗
t by whether the match is active in t for
the ﬁrst time or whether it has been producing previously, marked but superscripts e (existing)
and n (new). Also the bargaining power shock is indexed by the match duration.
The bargaining ﬁrst-order conditions for the wage rate by match duration read as
 J
e,n
t +  δ
W,e,n
t =  Δ
e,n










t +  zt +( α − 1) h
e,n
t =  w
e,n
t . (50)
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q  qt = βJEt





As an example for subsequent aggregation, the evolution of the aggregate real wage rate:
 wt =( 1− ϑ) we
t + ϑ wn
t . (56)
A.3 Eﬃcient Bargaining
The steady state equations and the linearized equilibrium conditions under EB largely coincide
with the ones under RTM bargaining with the exception of the following equations.
Steady State under Eﬃcient Bargaining
The wage-bargaining ﬁrst-order condition (35) is replaced by
ηJ =( 1− η)Δ.
reﬂecting that δF = δW under eﬃcient bargaining. As a consequence, we drop the steady state
equations governing these terms, (36) and (37), from the steady state of the model.
The ﬁrst-order condition for hours worked (38) changes to
mrs = xLzαhα−1.
The equation for the value of the ﬁrm (39) reads as
J =
1
1 − β(1 − ϑ)

xLzhα − wh − Φ

.
The remaining equations are identical with the ones under RTM. The steady state in the cali-
bration of the EB model underlying Figures 2 and 3 is given in Table 5.
Linearized Model Economy under Eﬃcient Bargaining
The linearized model economy under EB largely coincides with the one under RTM bargaining
with the exception of the following equations. As said, for eﬃcient bargaining we abstract from
wage rigidity by assumption. The wage-bargaining ﬁrst-order condition (40) is replaced by
 J∗
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Table 5: Steady State with Eﬃcient Bargaining
Variable Value Description
y 1o u t p u t .
c 0.6354 consumption.
g 0.3424 government consumption.
mrs 2.8687 marginal rate of substitution between leisure and cons.
w 2.8240 real hourly wage rate.
wh 0.9413 wage per employee.
u 0.0588 unemployment rate.
v 0.0854 vacancies (as share of labor force).
s 0.4802 probability of ﬁnding a job within a month.
q 0.3306 probability of ﬁnding a worker within a month.
b/(wh) 0.40 unemployment insurance replacement rate.
κv/y · 100 1.3563 percent share of output lost to vacancy posting.
Φ/(xLzhα) 0.0095 share of a labor ﬁrm’s revenue lost to ﬁxed costs.
ΨC/y 0.0909 proﬁt share (wholesale sector) in total output.
ΨLn/y 0.0145 proﬁt share (labor sector) in total output.
J 0.4813 value of a labor ﬁrm.
Δ 0.4813 surplus of the worker from working.
Notes: Steady state for the eﬃcient bargaining version of the model used in Figure 2. The targets are the
same as in Table 1 and so are most parameters. The exceptions being the following: γ =0 ,σm =0 .3984,
κ =0 .1588, κ
L = 310.24.
reﬂecting that  δ F
t =  δ W
t . As a consequence, we drop the equations governing these terms, (43)
and (44), from the model.
The ﬁrst-order condition for hours worked (41) changes to
 xL
t +  zt +( α − 1) ht = ϕ ht −  λt.
Equation (42) which linked newly bargained wages to aggregate wages is redundant – by as-
sumption in the EB model variant all wages are bargained every period.
The equation for the value of the ﬁrm (53) does not depend on wage stickiness anymore, in



























(1 + ϕ) ht −  λt

+(1 − ϑ − s)βΔEt





The vacancy posting equation (55) has the same form as under RTM (when setting γ =0 ) .45
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 wt +  ht

.
In the calibration of the EB model we assume the same size of ﬁxed costs, Φ, as under RTM.
Unemployment beneﬁts are small. Under EB this implies a much larger value of a job to a ﬁrm,
J, than under RTM. In turn this requires considerably higher vacancy posting costs, κ,t h a n
under the RTM calibration to match the labor market steady state targets. Typical calibrations
with EB would feature lower labor proﬁts and vacancy posting costs. In order to prevent that
the responses for output for EB in Figure 3 are disproportionately inﬂuenced by this (through
the response of vacancies), we therefore assume for the EB charts in Figure 3 that vacancy
posting costs do not require resources but are lump sum tax costs rebated to the family. For a
similar assumption see Trigari (2006). Note that this only aﬀects the scenario marked by green
squares in Figure 3.
The adjustments to the model economy in terms of the two vintages of matches in Figure 3 are
analogous to the ones described for right-to-manage bargaining.46
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